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The Crisis and Infl ation -Historical and Statistical Perspective
The success of EMU should be judged partly by its impact on infl ation in a world where infl ation was generally low and stable. Table 1 gives average infl ation rates across the main OECD countries over the twelve years prior to EMU and the same period after its formation, along with an indicator of relative improvement over the period. Infl ation performance improved most in Greece, Portugal, Sweden, Italy, Spain and the UK over this period, and it deteriorated in Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium. Two of those which improved most were outside the euro area.
The euro area as a whole improved its average annual infl ation rate between these periods by 1.36 percentage points. The level of infl ation in the euro area, at 1.84 per cent, was higher than in Canada, Sweden and Japan but lower than in Australia, Denmark, the UK and the USA.
During the latest recession, infl ation in many European countries fell to levels never observed before. In the second quarter of 2009, average prices in the euro area dropped by 0.4 per cent on an annual basis. This fall in infl ation resulted from several factors: a dramatic decline in economic activity, a rapidly worsening situation in the labour market that reduced pressures on wages, a depreciation of the euro, and a plunge in oil prices as output signifi cantly exceeded supply. Many of these factors were temporary and were likely to be reversed. Infl ation decreased very quickly. Over the period 2008Q3 through 2009Q2, infl ation fell from 3.8 per cent to -0.4 per cent. As the economy started recovering over the course of 2009, infl ation picked up. The pickup in infl ation was relatively fast, confi rming that the defl ation recorded in the second quarter of 2009 might have been a temporary phenomenon.
1 Figure 1 shows infl ation developments in the euro area over the period 1992-2010.
The decomposition of average euro area infl ation into its country components sketches an interesting picture of price developments in the single currency bloc. We have produced a sequence of charts showing how average infl ation in the euro area developed over time and how infl ation rates differed across individual members of the EMU. Figure 2 shows the distribution of infl ation in the current EMU countries before the crisis (in the third quar-
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ter of 2007), at the outset of the crisis (in the third quarter of 2008), at the height of the crisis (in the third quarter of 2009), and in the second quarter of 2010 (the latest available observation).
In the middle of 2007, before the global turbulences in financial markets started, infl ation in the majority of euro area countries remained below (or close) to the 2 per cent infl ation target set by the ECB. In the run up to the crisis, on the back of high economic growth, soaring oil prices, expanding bubbles in house prices and increased volatility in fi nancial markets, infl ation picked up signifi cantly. In all euro area countries, infl ation moved into territory much higher than the target. A year later at the height of the crisis, many of the euro area countries experienced defl ation driven by severe economic slack, weakening labour markets and a large drop in oil prices.
Over the last three quarters infl ation has picked up again, in many countries reaching a level just below the ECB target. However, the distribution of infl ation rates across EMU members seems to be much more uneven (the distribution is multimodal) than it was before the crisis, revealing the structural diffi culties from which some countries are suffering. In Ireland, recession and the pricking of the housing bubble resulted in a prolonged period of defl ation, with the second quarter of 2010 marking the fi fth consecutive quarter of falling prices. In Greece, which is fi ghting with a large budget defi cit, one of the costs of which is a high risk premium which raises production costs in the short run, infl ation was very high, exceeding 5 per cent, a level unobserved since 1997. However, there may be other reasons for high infl ation in Greece.
The Output Gap
One of the key determinants of the infl ation developments described above has been the size of the output gap, and there is a great deal more uncertainty about its current size than has been normal since EMU was formed. Its distribution across countries is also probably wider than in the past. The fi nancial market crisis that started in the summer of 2007 and worsened in the autumn of 2008 has led to a sharp short-term decline in output that exceeds its longer-term impact. We estimate that the permanent scar on output per person hour might be around three per cent. The scar is largely driven by a presumed 300 basis point rise in risk premia along with the structural deterioration of budget balances in all countries. This deterioration is worst in Spain and Ireland because of their previous reliance on taxation from an excessively buoyant housing market. The risk premium effect is likely to be common. The size of the scar differs between countries, and as Barrell 2 discusses, it will depend upon the relative size of the capital stock as compared to GDP. It will also depend on the level of the user cost of capital, and hence the rise in the risk premium will also have more effect in countries such as Germany, as we can see from Figure 3 , which is abstracted from Barrell.
3 Policy responses will have closed some of that gap, albeit with some cross-country variation. GDP has continued to rise in the euro area, the USA, Canada, Germany (where 2010Q1 marked the fourth quarter of growth) and the UK (where 2010Q1 marked the second quarter of growth). The economic activity remained somewhat lacklustre in Finland, Ireland, Spain and Italy, although the latter three countries saw positive growth rates in the fi rst three months of 2010. Output gaps are likely to be large in countries like Finland, where the cumulated fall in output is much in excess of our estimate of the scar, whilst the output gap is likely to be much lower in countries like Belgium, where this is not the case. On this basis, Germany, Italy, Ireland and Finland, countries where output falls have been large, are more at risk of defl ation than the euro area average. However, defl ation risks are not either 2 per cent infl ation or minus 1 per cent infl ation, but rather a continuum around a central distribution. In normal times, risks are distributed normally, whereas in abnormal times such as now, they can be skewed, especially by the existence of a zero lower bound on interest rates that prevents monetary policy from responding to defl ation in some circumstances. Tails on the downside then become long. monetary and fi scal policy to offset the crisis are at least part of the reason for the differences between countries over this period.
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Infl ation developments are expected to vary across European countries, refl ecting various output gap sizes and country-specifi c pressures coming from labour markets. Figure 5 shows fan charts of infl ation for the four biggest economies of the EMU: Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
With 95 per cent probability, infl ation in Germany will be in the range 1.2 to 1.8 per cent this year and 0.5
What Are the Risks of Defl ation vs. Excessive Infl ation in the Euro Area? Table 3 shows the evolution of annual infl ation from the start of the crisis. With the economy recovering and infl ation having already returned to its pre-crisis levels, we do not forecast defl ation in the euro area as a whole, although it is present in Ireland. Figure 4 shows a fan chart of infl ation in the EMU. With 95 per cent probability, infl ation in the euro area will settle between 0.9 and 1.5 per cent in 2010 and 1.2 and 2.4 per cent in 2011. The central path, although increasing, is expected to remain below the 2 per cent ECB target in the next years to come. As the output gap continues to close, infl ationary pressures will start building up. The high budget defi cits and related weakness of the euro will also contribute to rising infl ation.
Rising oil prices will result in higher fuel prices. The fan chart plots the 80, 90 and 95 percentage bounds around our July 2010 forecast out to 2015. They are generated by stochastic simulations on our global model NiGEM. Economic Trends to 2.3 per cent next year. On this basis, the probability of defl ation is relatively low. For France, the corresponding bands are 1.6 and 1.9 per cent in 2010 and 0.8 and 2.0 per cent in 2011. The ranges are relatively narrow for 2010 as we are already halfway through the year, but they widen noticeably into next year. For Italy and Spain, the range is somewhat wider, by about 1.8 percentage points in 2010 and 2.5 percentage points in 2011, refl ecting greater uncertainty surrounding infl ation developments and the general macroeconomic outlook in these countries. In Italy, with 95 per cent probability, infl ation will settle between 0.9 and 2.7 per cent this year and 0.7 and 3.5 per cent in 2011. In Spain, infl ation may be as low as 1.1 and as high as 2.8 per cent this year, and next year will see with 95 per cent probability infl ation between 1.2 and 4.2 per cent. The larger degree of uncertainty and the wider bands may imply that the risks of defl ation cannot be fully excluded (defl ation might materialise e.g. if Europe experienced a severe second dip of the recession). However, the risks of infl ation exceeding the ECB target seem to be more serious. And while there is a 5 per cent probability that prices in Italy or Spain will decline over the medium term, there is 20 per cent probability that infl ation in the euro area will exceed 2 per cent next year.
Policy Implications
The main challenge for monetary policy is to anchor infl ation expectations. Monetary policy has adopted a wide range of anti-crisis measures, both conventional and unconventional. The unconventional monetary policy measures in the euro area, predominantly encompassing credit easing and various measures infl uencing interbank market conditions such as exceptional long-term operations, broadening of eligible collateral, inter-central bank foreign exchange swap lines, as well as affecting the nonbank credit market through the purchase of covered bonds, are now being rolled back. All these measures could potentially raise infl ation if they were allowed to feed into the money stock and demand.
As the worst effects of the crisis ease, rising infl ation in the euro area will require interest rate increases. To avoid the risk of higher (than necessary) interest rates holding back economic growth, the consolidation of public fi nances is crucial. Balancing budget defi cits over the medium term will guarantee the optimal policy mix, ensuring sustainable growth and stable prices in the long run and avoiding unnecessary macroeconomic costs in the short term.
